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I. INTRODUCTION
Under section 33.01 of the Texas Family Code, a party may look to
* L. Wayne Scott, Prof. of Law, St. Mary's University, Editor Texas Lawyer's Civil Di-
gest, Board Certified Civil Appellate Law Practice.
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the parents of a child for redress when a child inflicts property dam-
age.1 This statute has survived constitutional attack in an intermedi-
ate Texas court2 and provides an expansive statutory avenue for
recovering damages previously unavailable at common law from the
parent for a child's acts. 3 This article will analyze the extent of paren-
tal liability under both of the available statutory provisions: negli-
gence and strict liability. The particular problems of culpability will
be reviewed in depth. The analysis will concentrate on the traditional
tort concepts of duty, breach, and causation as applied to this statute.
II. PARENTAL NEGLIGENCE: BACKGROUND
A. Common Law
At common law, the parent is generally not liable for the tortious
acts of a minor child. Courts have repeatedly stressed that liability
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1986). Liability extends also to "other per-
son[s]... who [have] have the duty of control and reasonable discipline of a child." However,
the statute fails to delineate what level of control over a child these "other persons" must
possess to premise liability. Id. Under the Family Code, the duty of control and discipline is
imposed upon a managing conservator, a parent, and a possessory conservator in possession of
a child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02(b)(2)(Vernon Supp. 1988); see also TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.04(a)(1) (Vernon 1986). A managing conservator may be a court appointed
agency, or an adult, other than a parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1988). Thus, liability may be imposed outside the traditional, natural parent-child rela-
tionship. See generally Note, Has the Family Code Made Any Changes in the Liability of a
Parent for His Child's Conduct?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 690-91 (1974).
2. Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e. (sections 33.01-.03 of Family Code did not deny equal protection or due process of
law). The basis of the lawsuit, however, was malicious and willful conduct on the part of the
minor. See id. at 674. The purpose of subsection (1) of section 33.01 of the Texas Family
Code may therefore be different, or at least subject to, further interpretation. See also Kelly v.
Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(held previous
statute, article 5923-1, constitutional).
3. See TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-.03 (Vernon 1986). Section 33.01 states:
A parent or other person who has the duty of control and reasonable discipline of a child
is liable for any property damage proximately caused by:
(1) the negligent conduct of the child if the conduct is reasonably attributable to the
negligent failure of the parent or other person to exercise that duty; or
(2) the willful and malicious conduct of a child who is at least 12 years of age but under
18 years of age.
Id. § 33.01.
4. See Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Ariz. 1973). The Parsons court held
that, at common law, parents will not be liable for their children's tortious acts, based on the
mere parental relationship. See id.; see also National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Fresch, 393 S.W.2d
48, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)(liability of parent not based on relationship but on negligence);
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does not exist simply because of the parent-child relationship.5 How-
ever, exceptions to the general rule exist, and the parent may be held
liable if:
1. the child is an agent of the parent;
6
2. the parent negligently intrusts a dangerous instrumentality to the
child;7
3. the parent ratifies the conduct of the child by acceptance or
consent;8
4. the parent directs the child in the commission of the tort;9
5. the tort is committed in the scope of duties the parent imposes on
the child.' 0
These limited instances of parental liability at common law require
Hackley v. Robey, 195 S.E. 689, 693 (Va. 1938)(absent master-servant or principal-agent rela-
tionship paternity alone does not impose liability).
5. See, e.g., Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1274; Zeeb v. Bahnmaier, 176 P. 326, 327 (Kan. 1918);
Fresch, 393 S.W.2d at 53; Hackley, 195 S.E. at 693.
6. See Hackley, 195 S.E. at 693 (principal-agent relationship will impose parental liabil-
ity); Hopkins v. Droppers, 198 N.W. 738, 739 (Wis. 1924)(no presumption of agency in do-
mestic relations).
7. See, e.g., Herrin v. Lamar, 126 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)(parents liable for
injuries sustained by plaintiff when foot run over by power lawn mower operated by defend-
ant's daughter); Lanterman v. Wilson, 354 A.2d 432, 435 (Md. 1976)(parents liable for plain-
tiff's injuries based upon allowing reckless son to drive automobile); Moore v. Crumpton, 285
S.E.2d 842, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)(parents failed to prevent access of son to deadly
weapon); McGinnis v. Kinkaid, 437 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981)(parents' acquies-
cence to possession of shotgun by minor with record of delinquency negligence). See generally
Comment, Torts-Parents'Liability for Child's Torts-Hopkins v. Droppers, 19 ILL. L. REV. 202,
204 (1924)(father delivered motorcycle to 15 year-old son, knowing law requires 16 years of
age).
8. See, e.g., Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210, 212-13 (N.C. 1962)(parent only liable if
consents or ratifies minor's conduct); Vinson v. McManus, 316 S.E.2d 98, 99 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984)(if plaintiff proves consent or ratification parent liable for tortious conduct of minor). See
generally Prescott & Kundin, Toward a Model Parental Liability Act, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 187,
191-92 (1984)(discussing common law of parental liability); Comment, Liability of Negligent
Parents for the Torts of Their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123, 131 (1966)(doctrine of
parental neglect may be considered extension of doctrine of dangerous instrumentality in that
child could be considered dangerous instrumentality); Comment, Parental Tort Liability, I
LAND & WATER L. REV. 299, 300 (1966)(listing five common law doctrines as exceptions to
general rule).
9. See Trahan v. Smith, 239 S.W. 345, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922, no
writ)(parent held liable for instructing sons to kill hog); Harrington v. Hall, 63 A. 875, 876
(Del. Super. Ct. 1906)(parent liable for directing son to kill plaintiff's dog). See generally, W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 871-73 (4th ed. 1971)(discussing liability for family torts).
10. See Klapproth v. Smith, 144 S.W. 688, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1912, no
writ)(to hold parent liable tort must be committed at parent's direction or within duties im-
posed on child by parent).
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parental knowledge of the child's propensity to engage in the conduct
which caused the damage in question." However, some courts have
refused to find a parent liable merely because the parent knew of the
child's vicious tendencies, although this knowledge is an important
factor in determining liability.1 2 This knowledge element is required,
even when the parent's own negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage. 3 Thus, the negligent parent who knew, or should have
known that the child could or would act in such a manner as to cause
damage would be held liable for failing to restrain the child.14
B. The Reform Movement
In the 1930's, Louisiana began a movement towards statutory im-
position of liability upon parents for the torts of their minor chil-
dren. 5 Under the Louisiana statute, the parents could be held liable,
regardless of whether they had knowledge of the child's vicious ten-
dencies.16 Critics of this vicarious liability pointed out that the Loui-
siana statute created a no-fault situation in civil law, which had been
11. See, e.g., Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440, 444 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)(parent not
liable unless opportunity to correct dangerous propensity); Martin v. Barrett, 261 P.2d 551,
552-53 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)(liability of parent upheld when parent has knowledge of
previous conduct but fails to warn plaintiff and child has disposition to do act); Norton v.
Payne, 281 P. 991, 993 (Wash. 1929)(held parent liable for child's dangerous habit of which
they had knowledge and failed to correct).
12. See Snow v. Nelson, 450 So.2d 269, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Court broadens
the rule of parental liability, based upon knowledge of his child's vicious tendencies to include
factors such as ability and opportunity to control the child); Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d 51, 53
(Pa. 1944)(mere knowledge not enough).
13. See, e.g., Dickens v. Barnham, 194 P. 356, 357 (Colo. 1920)(father negligent for son's
shooting since father knew child could not manage rifle but rifle accessible to son); Vallency v.
Rigillo, 102 A. 348, 349 (N.J. 1917)(dynamite cartridges left within easy reach of infant son
but parent still had to have knowledge of child's propensities); Moore v. Crumpton, 285 S.E.2d
842, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)(parent failed to prevent son from having access to deadly
weapon, but knowledge of child's propensities still required).
14. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wentz, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(par-
ent's liability depends upon knowledge and ability to control child's dangerous habit); Dickens,
194 P. at 357 (father proximate cause even though son fired shot since father knew son could
not manage rifle and did not make unaccessible); Massapequa Free School Dist. No. 23 v.
Regan, 405 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)(knowledgable negligent parent liable for
failure to restrain child).
15. See Note, Torts: Parent and Child: Liability of Parentfor the Torts of Minor Child,
19 CORNELL L.Q. 643, 646 (1933)(citing line of Louisiana cases from 1930's holding parents
liable for children's torts).
16. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1932); see also Johnson v. Butterworth, 152
S. 166, 169 (La. Ct. App. 1934)(to hold parent liable for minor's negligence not necessary to
show parent's knowledge of minor's conduct). See generally Note, Torts-Liability of a Parent
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expressly rejected at common law. 17 Despite this criticism, legisla-
tures began enacting parental liability statutes.' 8 Several states en-
acted these parental liability statutes to curb juvenile delinquency. 9
Apparently, some of these statutes were enacted to expand the com-
mon law, which originally left innocent victims with no way to re-
cover for their injuries caused by a child.
Because parental liability statutes were in derogation of the com-
mon law, courts have tended to interpret them strictly.2' Some courts
have reasoned that liability must be based on willful and malicious
conduct, and specifically reject the notion that liability is imposed on
parents for negligent control of their children.2 Other states have
held that the parents must have knowledge of the child's propensity
for the tortious activity in order to incur liability.22 Some of the juris-
dictions requiring knowledge, sometimes described as "foreseeabil-
for Act of Infant, 32 MICH. L. REV. 872, 873 (1934)(discussing parent's liability under La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 2318).
17. See Note, Torts: Parent and Child: Liability of Parent for the Torts of Minor Child,
19 CORNELL L.Q. 643, 646 (1933).
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 113(1) (Supp. 1967)(enactment 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572 (1958)(enactment 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (Supp. 1969)(enactment
1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (1968)(enactment 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. ii,
§§ 2001-05 (1969)(enactment 1967). For a summary of parental liability statutes in all juris-
dictions, see appendix. See generally Note, Parental Liability for a Child's Tortious Acts, 81
DIc K. L. REV. 755, 762 (1977)(parental liability has been expanded in forty-six states).
19. See Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(intent of statute
imposing liability on parents to curb juvenile delinquency); Hayward v. Ramick, 285 S.E.2d
697, 698 (Ga. 1982)(intent of statute to control juvenile delinquency not to compensate
victims).
20. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977)(statute in derogation of
common law presumed not to alter common law unless expressly declared); Sutherland v.
Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981)(statute contrary to common law strictly
construed).
21. See Laterman v. Wilson, 354 A.2d 432, 436 (Md. 1976)(negligence in controlling
one's child not reason for holding parent liable); Bell v. Hudgins, 352 S.E.2d 332, 334 (Va.
1987)(held not to establish blanket rule imposing liability on parents who fail to control con-
duct of their child).
22. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wentz, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(two
prerequisites to imposition of liability on parent are knowledge of dangerous habits and ability
to control child); Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269, 270-271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(parents
liable where son had propensity to be rough and one parent had seen minor play game before);
Clark v. McKerley, 497 A.2d 846, 847 (N.H. 1985)(parents not liable when no evidence that
parent knew child would set fire to another person's barn); Massapequa Free School Dist. No.
23 v. Regan, 405 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)(where parent negligent in failing to
restrain child plaintiff must further show knowledge element towards child's propensity to be
liable for child's tort).
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ity," additionally require negligence on the part of the parent in
failing to exercise reasonable control over their child to prevent
damage.2 a
In jurisdictions requiring a parent's negligence in controlling the
child, custody becomes an important issue.2 4 Liability has been im-
posed in situations where there has been merely legal custody of the
child, but many states require actual custody before imposing liabil-
ity.25 The reason for imposing liability only in cases where there was
actual custody is based on an application of general principles of neg-
ligence.26 First, to find the parent negligent in controlling the child, a
plaintiff must prove that the parent was, or should have been, aware
that there was a probability that the child would commit the tort.
27 If
the parent did not have actual custody of the child, then he could not
observe and control the child to prevent the probable damage that the
child might inflict.28 Therefore, it appears that the imposition of lia-
bility on parents who were not in actual custody of the child would
not deter negligent parental control. The difficulty of this view is that
parents may avoid liability by not maintaining custody of a child
known to have tortious propensities. This may be why other jurisdic-
tions have held that mere absence of the child from the parent's cus-
tody does not relieve the parent of liability.29 However, the
23. Robertson, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (primary consideration in establishing element of
duty under negligence concept is foreseeability of risk); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Fresch,
393 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)(liability of parents based on ordinary negligence and
what was reasonably foreseen).
24. See Robertson, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (under common law crucial factor in determin-
ing negligence liability is parents' ability to control child).
25. See, e.g., id. at 643; In re James D., 455 A.2d 966, 972 (Md. 1983)(parent not liable
when actual custody and control removed); Albert v. Ellis, 392 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1978)(parent not relieved of liability of minor child unless child marries, reaches age of
majority, or custody removed by court).
26. See Weisburt v. Flohr, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)(parent's duty
of care is dependent upon foreseeable dangers of child within parent's custody); see also In re
James D., 455 A.2d at 972 (discussing policy of actual custody requirement); Poston v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 320 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)(father not liable without
legal or actual custody of son).
27. See Weisburt, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (parent's duty of care dependent upon foreseeable
dangers of child within parent's custody); Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440, 444 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1956). In both Weisburt and Singer, recovery was denied on the ground that there was
no showing that the parent knew of any dangerous tendency. See Weisburt, 67 Cal. Rptr. at
122; Singer, 301 P.2d at 445.
28. In re James D., 445 A.2d at 972.
29. See Pisso v. Graves, 453 So.2d 592, 596 (La. Ct. App. 1984)(parent liable for seven-
teen year old son's tort even though son moved from mother's home two months prior to
[Vol. 20:69
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constitutionality of this position is questionable, as statutes imposing
liability, regardless of custody and control, have been both upheld and
struck down when attacked on due process grounds.30
C. Texas Common Law
Like other states, Texas common law recognized parental liability
for the torts of minor children only in a few limited situations.3, Gen-
erally, Texas common law only imposed liability on a parent for the
tort of a child when:
(1) a master/servant relationship existed between the parent and
child,32
(2) the parent had directed the child in the commission of the tortious
act,33 or
(3) the parent had negligently permitted this child to engage in conduct
likely to harm another.34
Further, the usual exceptions to the general rule of no parental liabil-
ity found in other states can be found in Texas.35
accident). In re James D., 455 A.2d at 972 (parent liable even though juvenile had been com-
mitted to juvenile facility). The court states that Texas is one of five states that requires legal
custody and control. Id.
30. Compare Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 461 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)(held constitutional)
with Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ga. 1971)(declared unconstitutional). The Texas
statute only imposes liability, not full compensation. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01
(Vernon 1986). Therefore, it more easily passes constitutionally required standards. See Buie
v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(upholding statute on equal protection and due process grounds).
31. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. Id.; see also De Anda v. Wake, 562 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ)(minor operating car at instance of her mother for mother's benefit established
relationship of principal and agent). But see Lessoff v. Gordon, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 214,
124 S.W. 182, 183 (1909, no writ)(citing to Ritter v. Thibodeaux, 41 S.W. 492, 493 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1897, no writ)(American rule that father not liable in course of employment
of child).
33. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d at 285.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Terry, 658 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1983, no writ)(parents liable for sons conduct only if willful and malicious); Moody v. Clark,
266 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(parent liable when
own negligence proximately causes injury). Such negligence is shown when the parent entrusts
the child with a dangerous instrumentality, or carelessly fails to restrain a child when he
knows he has dangerous tendencies. See id. But see Lessoff, 124 S.W. at 183 (parent not liable
for torts of child committed without parent's knowledge, consent or participation).
1988]
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III. THE TEXAS STATUTE
A. Section 33.01 of the Texas Family Code
According to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Fort Worth, sec-
tion 33.01 of the Texas Family Code was enacted in order to protect
and compensate property owners when their property is destroyed by
minors. 36 Under the old statute, article 5923-1 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes of 1962,37 there was no parental liability due to a breach
of the duty of control and reasonable discipline, as found in the intro-
ductory paragraph of section 33.01.38
B. Section 33.01(1) - Negligence of Parents
Section 33.01 has no express requirement that the parent have
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the child before the parent
can be held liable.39 However, the statute does require that both the
parent and the child be negligent before liability is imposed.' This
requirement seems to indicate that the proof of the parent's negli-
gence would necessitate the parents' knowledge of the child's tortious
tendencies. The circumstances of a particular case may allow a fact
finder to determine that there was evidence of the propensity toward
the conduct in question, and that the parent should have been aware
of it. The statute does contain the word "control,"4 1 which may indi-
cate a requirement for an opportunity to control the child, as well as
the need for the parent to have knowledge of the child's propensities.
However, it is not possible to know with certainty that the require-
ment of knowledge and notice will be within the court's interpretation
of the statute, as no case directly based on the introductory paragraph
to section 33.01 has arisen since its enactment.
The constitutionality of the Texas statute, however, has been con-
36. See Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(basis of lawsuit was minor's malicious and willful conduct).
37. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Vernon 1962).
38. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Vernon 1962)(no liability for
breach of duty to control) with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1986)(liability for
breach of duty to control).
39. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1986).
40. Id. § 33.01(1).
41. See id. Such a dual requirement would constitute a severe restriction on the effective-
ness of the first paragraph of Section 33.01. If the dual requirement is read into the statute,
consideration should be given to the elimination of the "control" language.
[Vol. 20:69
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firmed since the enactment of the new section.4 2 In Buie v. Long-
spaugh,43 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Fort Worth upheld
sections 33.01 through 33.03 of the Texas Family Code as constitu-
tional, stating that these sections did not deny litigants equal protec-
tion or due process.'
C. Section 33.01(2) - Strict Liability of Parents
Under section 33.01(2) of the Texas Family Code, a parent is vicar-
iously, or strictly liable, for property damage caused by the "willful
and malicious conduct of a child who is at least 12 years of age but
under 18 years of age."45 Prior knowledge of "willful and malicious
conduct of the child" by the parent was not a condition for the appli-
cation of the previous provision of the statute.46
42. See Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. 598 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. See id. at 676. Cases tracing the constitutionality and history of this type of legisla-
tion include: Bryan v. Kitmura, 529 F. Supp. 394, 399-402 (D. Hawaii 1982)(held constitu-
tional); Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191, 193 (Conn. App. Ct. 1977)(constitutional); Corley v.
Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ga. 1971)(held unconstitutional); Vanthournout v. Burge, 387
N.E.2d 341, 343-344 (Ill. 1979)(constitutional); In re James D., 455 A.2d 966, 972 (Md.
1983)(constitutional); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C.
1963)(constitutional); Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 431 A.2d 799, 804 (N.J.
1981)(constitutional), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981); Rudnay v. Corbett, 374 N.E.2d
171, 174-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)(constitutional); Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 426
P.2d 442, 444 (Wyo. 1967)(constitutional). See also In Re John H., 443 A.2d 594, 598 (Md.
1982)(issue discussed generally but error not preserved since parents did not argue issue of
constitutionality).
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01(2) (Vernon 1986). Again, a person other than a par-
ent may be liable for the conduct of a child, if such "other person" has the duty of control and
reasonable discipline of the child. Id. Section 33.02 of the Family Code limits recovery under
section 33.01(2) "to actual damages, not to exceed $15,000.00 per act, plus court costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees." Id. § 33.02. Section 33.02 was amended in 1981, increasing the
amount recoverable under section 33.01(2) from $5,000.00 per act to $15,0000.00 per act. See
id. (Historical Note).
46. See id. § 33.01(2) (Vernon 1986). Although subsection one clearly requires negli-
gence on the part of the parent, subsection two notably omits any requisite of negligence on the
part of a parent to impose liability, which would include prior knowledge. See id. The courts
and commentators are in agreement on this point. See Buie, 598 S.W.2d at 676 (nothing in
analysis of [now] section 33.01(2) implies element of knowledge or opportunity for correction
as requirement for liability); accord Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(prior knowledge of parent should not be read into previous
statute article 5923-1). See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON TORTS 912-14 (5th ed. 1984) (vicarious liability for torts of family);
Note, Torts, Parent and Child-Parent Liable for the Malicious and Willful Torts of Child Under
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Article 5923-1 (Vernon Supp. 1958), 37 TEX. L. REV. 924, 924-928
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To premise liability under section 33.01(2), it must be established
that the actions of the child entailed willful and malicious conduct.47
The courts of Texas, however, have yet to define with clarity what
level of culpability satisfies the "willful and malicious conduct" stan-
dard of section 33.01(2). This author concludes that the gross negli-
gence of a child, which proximately causes an accident or damage,
will suffice as willful and malicious conduct. Under this standard, if a
child acts with gross negligence in undertaking an act which subse-
quently causes damages, the child is imputed by law to have intended
the result, therefore satisfying the willful and malicious standard of
section 33.01(2).
1. Meaning of "Willful and Malicious" Generally
The meaning of "willful and malicious" under the statute must be
put in the context of the varying degrees of requisite mental states
necessary to impose liability. These mental states range from intent to
strict liability, which imposes liability even in the absence of intent.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, equates "willful and malicious"
conduct with recklessness (or gross negligence), a mental state which
requires something more than negligence, yet not the conscious desire
implied by intent.48 Even in intentional torts, a finding of intent is not
conditioned on the existence of a subjective intent to bring about
harm, but an intent to do the act which results in harm.49 To impose
on the phrase "willful and malicious," the requirement of specific in-
tent to bring about the desired harm would make the required mental
state under section 33.01(2) something more than intent. This would,
in effect, only impose liability in cases of vandalism. If the phrase
"willful and malicious" is given the meaning assigned to it by the Re-
statement, gross negligence, then it has the effect of broadening paren-
tal responsibility to include acts of their children which are beyond
mere negligence, but not yet vandalism.
(1959)(discussing parent's liability for child's willful and malicious torts); Rogers, Chapter 33.
Liability of Parentsfor Conduct of Child, 13 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1982)(commen-
tary on section 33.01(1) and (2) of the Texas Family Code); Note, Has the Family Code Made
Any Change in Liability of a Parent for His Child's Conduct, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 688-689
(1974)(discussing parents vicarious liability).
47. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01(2) (Vernon 1986).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282, § 500 (1977).
49. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984).
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Until 1978, courts usually interpreted the phrase "willful and mali-
cious" consistent with the Restatement meaning of recklessness, as it
related to the Bankruptcy Code.50 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a
bankrupt was not discharged from obligations arising from a willful
and malicious injury to a person or property.51 Consequently, there
were many decisions on what constituted willful and malicious in-
jury. Many courts 2 followed the "reckless disregard" standard as set
forth in Tinker v. Colwell.53 Under that standard, acting in "reckless
disregard" for the safety of persons or property could be construed as
a willful and malicious action, even in the absence of a specific intent
to cause the damage. 54 Moreover, to overcome this construction, the
usual interpretation of "willful and malicious" was recklessness,
which Congress, in 1978, specifically attached to those words in the
context of the bankruptcy statute." The new congressionally man-
dated meaning of a willful and malicious act is a deliberate action
intending the resultant damage.-6 Absent such a clear legislative
mandate, then the usual interpretation given to "willful and mali-
cious" is that of recklessness or gross negligence.
a. Malice Defined Under Texas Law
"Malice" is a term of general, not specific, intent. Neither the
50. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 141-142 (1916)(disregard of duty
constitutes willful and malicious act); Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141, 146 (La. App.
1950)(driving while intoxicated was construed under bankruptcy law as constituting willful
and malicious conduct); Cogswell v. Kells, 292 N.W. 483, 485 (Mich. 1940)(willful and mali-
cious acts under bankruptcy act mean something more than accidental act).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)(1982). Section 523(a)(6) states that ". . . [a] discharge under
section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt
...for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of
another entity ...." Id.
52. See, e.g., McIntyre, 242 U.S. at 141-42 (disregard of duty constitutes willful and mali-
cious act); Rosen, 47 So. 2d at 146 (driving while intoxicated was construed under bankruptcy
law as constituting willful and malicious conduct); Cogswell, 292 N.W. at 485 (willful and
malicious acts under the bankruptcy act mean something more than accidental act). But see,
e.g., In re Vena, 46 F.2d 81, 81 (W.D. Wash. 1930) (willful and malicious acts products of
intentional evil design); Prater v. King, 37 S.E.2d 155, 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946)(no matter how
great degree of negligence still not willful and malicious); Seward v. Gatlin, 246 S.W.2d 21, 22
(Tenn. 1952)(gross negligence not enough to constitute willful and malicious behavior).
53. 193 U.S. 473 (1920).
54. See id. at 475.
55. See 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6320-21.
56. Id.
57. J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 20(b) (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 766 (2d ed.
1969).
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words "malicious" nor "willful" require the proof of specific intent.5"
In Rankin v. State,59 the court held that "the words 'willful' and 'ma-
licious' have the same legal meaning . . . as do the words 'malice
aforethought' in murder cases."'  Malice includes all states of mind
which cause a result which would exculpate or mitigate.61 Malice in-
cludes a willful disregard for the rights of others, which results in
injury to another.62 In at least one case, Cockrell v. State,63 the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals sustained a murder with malice conviction
on the basis of the defendant's disregard for the rights of others, evi-
denced by the defendant's reckless driving." Whether the Cockrell
case was limited to its facts is not significant here. What is important
is the recognition that the term "malice" changes its meaning from
crime to crime, just as modem concepts of intent change from crime
to crime.65 In the context of this civil statute, the term "malicious"
seems to indicate that form of intent now covered by the concepts of
intentional, knowing, and reckless conduct under the Texas Penal
Code. However, the term does not appear to cover accidental con-
duct or ordinary negligence.
In the context of the civil liability of parents for the acts of minors,
it seems that the cases requiring the concurrence of intent and injury
take an extreme position. This is best illustrated by the Kansas case
of Hanks v. Booth.6 6 In Hanks, several children were found to have
intended to set a fire, but not to have burned down the plaintiff's
barn.67 The Kansas Supreme Court refused to impose liability on the
58. See Rankin v. State, 139 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940)(quoting from 29
Tex. Jur. 2d Homicide § 189).
59. 139 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940).
60. See Rankin, 139 S.W.2d at 812. But see Westbrook, The Role of Specific Intent in
Criminal Law, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 32, 38 (1962)(critizing Rankin decision). The passage of
the 1972 Penal Code ended fruitful discussion on this question. However, Rankin represents
the accepted trend not to require a specific intent, unless mandated by specific wording in a
statute. See Rankin, 139 S.W.2d at 812.
61. See Sowell v. State, 503 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)(explaining legal
meaning of malice). See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 767 (2d ed. 1969).
62. J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 69 (1934); see also Ramsey v. Arrot, 64 Tex. 320, 323
(1885).
63. 135 Tex. Crim. 218, 117 S.W.2d 1105 (1938).
64. Cockrell v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 218, 225-227, 117 S.W.2d 1105, 1108-110 (1938).
65. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 769 (2d ed. 1969).
66. 716 P.2d 596, 598 (Kan. 1986).
67. Id. at 598. The Kansas court reasoned: "...while there was evidence that the chil-
dren willfully and intentionally lit matches and small piles of hay on fire, they believed the fires
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minor children absent a showing that the offending act of the children
and the resulting damage were malicious and willful.6" Cases such as
Hanks ignore the purpose of the statute. This standard might be ap-
propriate for determining whether the children were guilty of arson,
but should not preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages for the
wrongful burning of his barn from the parents of these children.
Therefore, if the initiating act was intentional and malicious, or the
equivalent thereof, and the damage was a foreseeable consequence of
the initiating act, then statutes such as section 33.01(2) of the Family
Code should be satisfied. Although there are cases to the contrary
which require intent to bring about the consequences of the action,
these are in the context of criminal proceedings in which a higher
standard of proof is necessary in comparison to civil proceedings.69
Therefore, the most logical standard involves an inquiry into whether
the foreseeable consequences of the malicious act were caused by the
act. The issue, then, is what consequences can be considered
foreseeable.
In Texas, the two elements of causation are cause-in-fact and fore-
seeability.7' The Texas Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Mr. Property
Management,7 reviewed the two requirements:
Cause-in-fact denotes that the negligent act or omission was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the injury and without which no harm
would have been incurred ....
... Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelli-
gence, would have anticipated the dangers that his negligent act created
for others ....72
Under Nixon, an act may be held foreseeable, regardless of whether
the actor specifically anticipated how the injuries would grow out of
were extinguished and the evidence fails to prove the children intended to burn down plain-
tiff's barn ...." Id.
68. See Hanks, 716 P.2d at 598.
69. See Lamb v. Peck, 441 A.2d 14, 16 (Conn. 1981)(parents liable when minor intention-
ally aids another in injury of person).
70. See, e.g., City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Tex. 1987); Missouri Pac.
R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co.,
529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1975); East Tex. Theaters, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466, 468
(Tex. 1970).
71. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985).
72. Id. at 549-50.
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the dangerous situation. 73 Rather, if the actor "should have reason-
ably foreseen that the event ... would occur," the cause-in-fact ele-
ment is satisfied.74 To hold that section 33.01(2) requires that the
child intend the consequences that result from the willful or malicious
act would vitiate the act and render it virtually worthless."
b. Criminal Culpability
The result is not changed if the question of foreseeability is treated
as a question of criminal culpability. The terms "willful and mali-
cious" are imprecise, and have generally been abandoned in criminal
matters.76 Rather, intent is now generally discussed in terms of culpa-
ble mental states, including "intentional, knowing, reckless, and crim-
inal negligence" under the Texas Penal Code.7 Thus,
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objec-
tive or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.78
Likewise,
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of




A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.80
Finally,
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
73. See id.
74. Id.; see also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 552 S.w.2d at 103.
75. The question is, really, whether the legislature intended that the statute only apply to
acts of vandalism, or whether it intended the statute to apply to willful and malicious acts of
children that were performed without thought about the possibility of damage. Certainly the
statute should apply in the latter instance, which is this case.
76. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (Vernon 1974)(excluding willful and malicious
as culpable mental state).
77. Id.
78. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (a) (Vernon 1974).
79. Id. § 6.03 (b).
80. Id. § 6.03 (c).
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conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.81
In the case of reckless conduct, there is a disregard of the risk,
while criminal negligence involves the failure to perceive the risk.
2. "Willful and Malicious" Conduct of Children: Other
Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions have not been uniform in addressing the level of
culpability required to hold parents liable for the willful and malicious
conduct of their child.82 In some jurisdictions, conduct recognized as
reckless or grossly negligent, will satisfy the willful and malicious re-
quirement.83 As discussed in the New Mexico Supreme Court case of
Ortega v. Montoya: 4
There is very little, if any, difference between 'willful' and 'malicious'
conduct ... and when [the statute] characterizes an act as being done
'willfully' or 'maliciously', it denotes the intentioned doing of a harmful
act without just cause or excuse or an intentional act done in utter dis-
regard for the consequences ... and does not necessarily mean actual
malice or ill will .... 8
Under the reasoning of this case and others like it, a child's specific
intent to cause property damage is apparently not necessary in order
to impose liability on the parent. Rather, a lesser degree of culpable
conduct by the child, including reckless conduct, will suffice to confer
liability upon the parent.
Another view among jurisdictions is that a finding of "willfully
damaging" must be premised on findings that both the initial act, and
the subsequent damage, were done intentionally.86
81. Id. § 6.03 (d).
82. See appendix (culpability ranges from willful, malicious, strict liability, intentional,
delinquents, purposefully, criminal recklessly, and unlawful).
83. See McKinney v. Cabell, 198 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974)(minor's reck-
less conduct can qualify as willful or malicious destruction of property).
84. Ortega v. Montoya, 637 P.2d 841, 843 (N.M. 1981).
85. Id. at 842-43. The Ortega court relied heavily on the earlier case of Potomac Ins. Co.
v. Torres, 401 P.2d 308, 309 (N.M. 1965), wherein the court noted that the child's act in
driving at high speeds in crowded business district, trying to evade police pursuit, and hitting
the plaintiff's car which was stopped at a traffic light, was more than mere negligence in trying
to pass, and was clearly more than a lack of sound judgment. The child's intentional acts were
undertaken without just cause or excuse, and evidenced an utter disregard for their conse-
quences. From this conduct, the requisite malice or willfulness was inferred. Id. at 309.
86. See, e.g., Crum v. Groce, 556 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Colo. 1976)(to support finding of
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3. The Texas Interpretation
a. "Willful and Malicious" Defined as Gross Negligence
Texas has yet to articulate the requisite level of culpability required
to satisfy the willful and malicious standard of section 33.01(2). An
insight, however, may be obtained from the current Texas view on
gross negligence. In Burke Royalty v. Walls, 7 the Texas Supreme
Court recognized that to require the plaintiff to prove gross negli-
gence, by direct evidence of the defendant's subjective state of mind,
would leave outrageous conduct unpunished. 8 Combining the two
traditional tests for gross negligence ("an entire want of care" and
"reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others"), the Texas
civil test is both an objective and subjective test. 9 Thus, a plaintiff
may establish a defendant's gross negligence by proving that the de-
fendant had "actual subjective knowledge that his conduct created an
extreme degree of risk." 90 The plaintiff may also prove gross negli-
gence by reference to an objective standard showing that in the same
circumstances a reasonable person would realize that his conduct
"created an extreme degree of risk to the safety of others." 91
The logic of the quoted cases and the posture of Texas law require
the conclusion that in Texas reckless or grossly negligent conduct will
satisfy the statutory requirement for willful and malicious conduct.
"maliciousness" plaintiff must show child intentionally damaged property or motivated by
mischievous purpose or design to injure); Hanks v. Booth, 726 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Kan. 1986)(to
state cause of action plaintiff must prove act of child and resulting damage willful and mali-
cious); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bill, 383 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ohio 1978)(willfully damaging
property means intentional act which occasions resulting loss coupled with intent of causing
damage).
87. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
88. See id. at 922.
89. Id.
90. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7 (2d ed. 1986). Lafave and Scott
suggest that the existence of subjective awareness of conduct, creating a higher degree of risk,
is necessary to criminal recklessness, as opposed to criminal negligence. Id. § 3.7(d). How-
ever, they recognize that "subject realization of risk ... must generally be inferred from ...
words and conduct in the light of the circumstances." Id.
91. Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985). Cases such as Suth-
erland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140-141 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981)(willful and malicious is subjective
on part of actor) and Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henley, 628 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Ark.
1982)(parent must actually have knowledge of child's propensity) are directly to the contrary.
Most of these courts, however, mix this issue with the issue of causation, and are discussed in
the next section. These cases, while not discussing causation, seem to indicate that reckless or
grossly negligent conduct which leads to an injury cannot be a cause in fact, unless there was
an intent to cause injury.
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However, there remains the problem of satisfying the causal require-
ment of this statutory cause of action. The problem is whether a
child, who intentionally undertakes an act, but does not intend the
subsequent damage, fulfills the causal element of the statute.
D. Causation
Accepting that recklessness or gross negligence will satisfy the
"willful and malicious" requirement, the problem of causation must
be resolved. Even if the damage by the child was entirely foreseeable,
it may not have been intended. In order to determine whether causa-
tion exists, two issues must be decided: first, whether the undertaking
of a potentially damaging act can be considered as the cause-in-fact of
the accident or damage; and second, whether an act classified either as
grossly negligent, or willful and malicious, which produces a foresee-
able result, can be sufficient cause under a willful and malicious
standard.
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, in Kelly v. Williams,92 did not
separate the issues as just stated, but seems to have resolved both, by
impliedly holding that the acts related to the theft of a car could be a
legally sufficient cause of the damage to the car resulting from an acci-
dent.93  In Kelly, the child stole the plaintiff's car, and was then in-
volved in a high speed chase with the police, which resulted in
damage to the stolen car.94 The trial court entered judgment for the
plaintiff against the child's father.95 The Court of Civil appeals af-
firmed, reasoning that there was " but one transaction, the damaged
car proximately resulting from the initial theft."96 Because the act of
taking the car was intentional and malicious, the foreseeable results
flowing from that malicious activity could also be considered mali-
cious, and the initial act was the cause of the damage sustained by the
plaintiff.
9 7
Other jurisdictions have reached similar results under similar fact
patterns.98  In Crum v. Groce,99 however, the Colorado Supreme
92. 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. See id. at 437.
94. See id. at 435.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 437.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Tassinary v. Moore, 446 A.2d 13, 14-15 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982)(conversion
cause of action sufficiently stated in complaint without stating whether damage occurred inten-
1988]
ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:69
Court reasoned that while the theft of a vehicle was willful and mali-
cious, the injury was not."° There was no evidence to support a find-
ing that the child damaged the property intentionally, and the Crum
court chose not to see the activity as one continuous event, severing
the damage to the vehicle from its theft.0 1
The reasoning of the Crum decision speaks in terms of the criminal
concurrence of intent and injury. 112 The Texas statute in question
does not require the concurrence of any specific intent and injury,
unless it is implied by the use of the enigmatic term "malicious."'
' 0 3
This author concludes that the term malicious is insufficient to add a
specific intent, beyond the intent to willfully perform an act with the
awareness that the act may foreseeably cause injury to another.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under section 33.01(1) of the Texas Family Code, a parent is liable
for the ordinary negligence of the child if the parent is found, upon
proper proof, to have knowledge of the child's tortious tendencies.
It would appear from history, from the better reasoned precedent,
and from the controlling precedent in Texas,1°4 that section 33.01(2),
tionally or negligently); Hyman v. Davies, 453 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. App. 1983)(parents not
liable for recovery of lost wages and towing charges since this portion of judgment did not
arise from intentionally caused property damage); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Torres, 401 P.2d 308,
309 (N.M. 1965)(minor's intentional act of driving at excessive speed through crowded busi-
ness district may readily infer required malice or willful conduct). The decision in Amarillo
Nat'l Bank v. Terry, 658 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ), that there must be
proof that the child's act was both willful and malicious, is not in conflict with Williams. Id. at
704. The Amarillo court was dealing with an admitted request that the act was willful, with
no admission or evidence that the act was "malicious." See id.
99. 556 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1976).
100. See id. at 1224.
101. See id.; see also Town of Groton v. Medberry, 301 A.2d 270, 272 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1972). The Groton court similarly held the proof of specific malicious or willful behavior does
not establish malicious or willful injury. See Groton, 301 A.2d at 272.
102. See Crum, 556 P.2d at 1224; accord Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bill, 383 N.E.2d
880, 884 (Ohio 1978)(both act and subsequent damage must be intentional for parental liabil-
ity); Peterson v. Slone, 383 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Ohio 1978)(term "willfully damages property"
means intent of act coupled with purpose or intent of injury and resulting damage); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Brooks, 395 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)(parents not liable when
daughter's damage to automobile not willful even though taking of said automobile considered
willful). W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.11 (2d ed. 1986)(concurrence of
mental fault with acts and results).
103. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1986).
104. See Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 436-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)(often cited Texas case upholding constitutionality of statute which holds parents
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Texas Family Code, imposes vicarious liability upon the parent of
juveniles, who voluntarily undertake an act which produces an injury
to another, if the minor acted in a manner that would satisfy, in a civil
proceeding, the Texas Penal Code definitions of criminal recklessness
or criminal negligence. While the phrases, criminal recklessness and
criminal negligence, do not translate exactly into the terms of the civil
law, it seems clear that gross negligence on the part of the juvenile is
sufficient for parental liability under section 33.01(2), but that ordi-
nary negligence is not.
In an age when tort liability is determined more from an insurance
theory than a fault theory, section 33.01 of the Family Code will be an
anachronism, unless it is construed to impose liability where fault
clearly exists. The legislative limits upon parental liability for the or-
dinary negligence of a child, in section 33.01(1) of the Texas Family
Code, while well founded in history, seem outmoded in light of the
ready availability of liability insurance, and the law's imposition of a
greater level of civilization upon society as a whole. Consideration
should be given to an expansion of parental liability to cover, without
prior parental knowledge, conduct of a child, which would fall within
the definition of criminal negligence.
The use of dusty terms such as "willful" and "malicious", in sec-
tion 33.01(2) of the Texas Family Code, should not mislead any inter-
preter. This statute was not written to cover only acts of vandalism,
but also acts of gross negligence. However, for clarity, any future
amendments should eliminate the terms "willful" and "malicious" in
favor of "intentional" and "grossly negligent conduct".
V. APPENDIX
State Cite Type Liability Amount Date
Imposed' Passed
2
Alabama ALA. CODE § 6- Intentional, $500 + court 1965
5-380 (1987) Willful or cost 1965$
Malicious
liable for minor's willful and malicious conduct); see also Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673,
676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(upheld constitutionality of new stat-
ute and explained purpose of statute). Further, this result appears to be in line with modern
Texas cases on causation.
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ANN. § 32-1-46
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* change in culpability.
"enactment of atty. fees + court cost.
1. See Concise Oxford Dictionary 1231 (7th ed. 1982). Wilful (preferred) for which
compulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded as excuse, intentional,
deliberate, due to perversity or self-will. Willful - etymologies, form not recorded
but merely inferred.
2. Date parental liability first imposed. Where date is listed "as of," the actual date
or enactment may precede such date.
